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EDITORIAL: Some misconceptions about the Taliban

There are certain explanations of the phenomenon of the Taliban which tend to strengthen the broad misconceptions on the subject in Pakistan. When these come from retired Pakistani generals, such “theorising” points to the intent behind the policies followed in the past; it also complicates the collective effort in Pakistan to face up to the threat of the Taliban. Above all, it highlights the “psychological” problems among the officers who dealt with the Americans on the one hand and Afghan warlords on the other as “partners” in Afghanistan, and their ultimate “break” with the post-9/11 decisions made in Islamabad.

Some retired officers say the Taliban are fighting to avenge what took place in Pakistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks, especially those [Taliban] fighting to avenge what happened during the military operation that was carried out in Lal Masjid. But, they claim, these are not currently active after the new government took over power in Islamabad. Who, then, are these Taliban who apparently went to Afghanistan after 9/11 to “fight the Americans” and then got offended with the Lal Masjid operation in 2007, and then in 2008 simply stopped existing?

What has been left out in these claims is the “creation” of Pakistani Taliban to help the Kabul government of Mullah Umar after 1997 against resistance from what later came to be called Northern Alliance, whose leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was killed by Al Qaeda hours before 9/11. No reference is made by these retired army officials to the despatch of thousands of seminarians from the Pakistani border areas into Afghanistan as warriors. Before 9/11, when the Americans were bothered by Al Qaeda and wanted Pakistan to help get the Taliban to oust Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan, Pakistan decided to pursue strategic depth instead of fighting global terrorism. In fact, there is some evidence that on the Pakistani side, policy was “diversified” on the basis of “personal” affiliations between Mullah Umar and some key Pakistani officials.

One general interviewed proudly said that when “he sent his two sons to jihad” against the Soviet forces “along with the Afghan jihadi leader Jalaluddin Haqqani” it was on the general pattern of intelligence officers pursuing state policy without letting their personal friendships with the Taliban get in the way. Here is one classic view: “I am a retired official but the Al Qaeda Afghan elements — Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Karzai (sic!), and others — are against Pakistan, but they are my friends”. What applies to this gentleman is, however, not supposed to apply to the personnel now in service. This is supposed to mean that the “allegations” that Pakistan has a nexus with Haqqani and Hekmatyar today are incorrect. The opposite is the case actually.

The part about those among the Taliban who were offended by the Lal Masjid affair and then “gave up” after the coming to power of the new government in 2008, remains obscure. Lal Masjid was the underside of Pakistan’s Taliban policy of “strategic depth”. The non-Islamists within the structure of the state focused on its India-specific intent and were not bothered by the nexus they thus formed with officials who interpreted “depth” as a transformation of Pakistan itself. Lal Masjid was allowed to become a watering-hole of all kinds of terrorist organisations with Al Qaeda affiliations. The proof of this came when revenge against the Lal Masjid operation was vowed by Aiman Al Zawahiri himself in a special message and echoed by the Taliban in South Waziristan and Swat.

The assertion that “we helped the Taliban at first but we ended the training in 1989”, leaves out the entire swath of activities that involved the preparation of jihadi organisations inside Pakistan used in Indian-administered Kashmir as “freedom-fighters” despite the fact that they were beginning to be dubbed terrorists at the UN Security Council and put on watch-lists in the West. As Mr Rehman Malik says, these Pakistan-trained militias are now with the Taliban.

To say that “the Americans are supplying the Taliban with arms and equipment” today is to reject the logic of war through an intricate imagination of conspiracy. It is like saying that Baitullah Mehsud is supplied with money and material by the US and India and then bombed through drones to get him to strike at Pakistan at Manawan in Lahore. But the interviewee calls this logic “very simple”. Also the argument that the Taliban were able to dominate in Afghanistan because of their advocacy of sharia, and that women had rights under them, is also “very simple”. It is also “very simple” that after this interview, Pakistan will have even less credibility in the eyes of the world. *

SECOND EDITORIAL: Christians of Tiasar Town

The National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP), a Christian organisation devoted to human rights, has clarified what happened recently to a Roman Catholic community in Karachi. The NCJP letter says, “On 22 April 2009, some extremists attacked a Christian settlement called Tiasar Town, or Khuda ki Basti at Karachi, injuring four persons and torching six houses. The incident followed a wall chalking a day earlier in the settlement in Christian colony, including a church wall. The inscription said ‘Taliban are coming’, ‘Long live Taliban’ and ‘Be prepared to pay Jiziya or embrace Islam’”.

The Christians were attacked when they tried to wipe the wall-chalkings. The attackers were “Pathans living opposite the Christian settlement”. They used firearms and beat up the Christian men and women. The attack came in two instalments; the second one in the afternoon was more intense and resulted in bullet wounds to four Christian men. One Irfan Masih later died in hospital. Houses of three Christians were set on fire and Bibles were ritually burned. Some police personnel from Sarjani Town police station were present on the scene but “they did nothing to prevent the incident”. The police stated that the fire was opened from both sides, but interestingly only Christians got injured.

More interestingly, only the MQM expressed solidarity with the Christians. And “Mr Altaf Hussain, the founder and Chairman of MQM spoke on telephone from London to the delegation of NCJP and promised to stand with the community through thick and thin”. This speaks volumes for how the state of Pakistan is behaving under the threat of extremism. *

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